








ON THE LABOUR MARKET
EFFECTS OF EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION
The links between employment protection (regula-
tions concerning hiring and firing) and the perfor-
mance of the labour market have occasioned
extensive debate. At issue is the question whether
excessively strict employment protection is a major
contributor to the persistently high unemployment
experienced in many European countries since the
1980s. Some argue that employment protection, by
raising firms’ firing costs,acts as a deterrent against
hiring new workers and that, moreover, it consti-
tutes an extra source of bargaining power for the
protected employees (insiders), resulting in higher
wages. On the other hand there are those who
argue that employment protection reduces the
inflow into unemployment.They add that it creates
stable employment relationships which favour the
introduction of new technologies as well as the
reorganisation of working practices and enhances
investment in training and skill formation. In their
view, the rise in productivity compensates for high-
er firing costs.
New empirical findings
Until recently,empirical research had not provided
a clear-cut answer to the question raised above.
The major reason is that most of the cross-country
research had used data on employment protection
at one point in time (that is the late 1980s).2
Therefore, institutional changes could not be mea-
sured. Moreover, the number of individual indica-
tors for measuring the overall strictness of employ-
ment protection was too small. Meanwhile the
OECD has gathered new information which it pre-
sented in 1999.3 It extends prior research in two
ways:First,it presents new data describing employ-
ment protection in the late 1990s and makes them
comparable to data of the late 1980s. Secondly, it
provides a new, much richer data base. It identifies
those aspects of employment protection (e.g. pro-
cedural requirements, notification periods or sev-
erance pay) that are most important for reassess-
ing the relationship between employment protec-
tion and labour market performance.
According to the OECD, employment protection
refers to both, regulations concerning hiring (e.g.
rules favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for
giving temporary or fixed-term contracts, training
requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy proce-
dures, mandated notification periods and severance
payments, special requirements for collective dis-
missals and short-time work schemes).Various insti-
tutional arrangements can provide employment pro-
tection:the private market,labour legislation,collec-
tive bargaining agreements, and court interpreta-
tions of legislative and contractual provisions. The
OECD has compiled information on 22 indicators
for 27 countries.Twelve indicators refer to the strict-
ness of dismissal regulation for regular and perma-
nent workers. Six indicators refer to the regulation
of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work.
Four indicators measure the strictness of collective
dismissal regulation.These 22 indicators provide the
inputs for the construction of cardinal summary indi-
cators of employment protection strictness.
Easing employment protection ...
There is significant variation in employment pro-
tection, both with respect to the overall level of
strictness and with respect to the relative emphasis
placed on different components of regulation. The
Southern European countries stand out for having
relatively strict employment protection, along with
1 DICE = Database of Institutional Comparison in Europe.
2 M. Emerson (1988), Regulation or De-regulation of the Labour
Market: Policy Regimes for the Recruitment and Dismissal of
Employees in Industrialised Countries, European Economic
Review, April, 775–817; G. Bertola (1990), Job Security,
Employment and Wages, European Economic Review, June,
851–886; D. Grubb and W. Wells (1993), Employment Regulation
and Patterns of Work in EC Countries, OECD Economic Studies
No. 21, Winter, 7–58; OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study,
Evidence and Explanations, Part II, Paris. 3 OECD (1999), Employment Outlook 1999, Chapter 2, Paris.France, Germany and Sweden. On the other
extreme, regulation is least restrictive in the
United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
Canada and Ireland (see Table, column 8).
Between the 1980s and the late 1990s, there was
some easing of employment protection in nine
countries, unchanged strictness in eight countries,
and a tightening of restrictions in one country,
France (Table, columns 6 and 7). Reduction in the
overall strictness of employment protection was –
as a rule – not due to an easing in regular contracts.
In fact, there was a considerable continuity of
employment protection in this area. The only
exceptions were Finland, Portugal and Spain which
significantly eased employment protection for per-
manent workers (Table, columns 1 and 2).
... encourages temporary work
In order to enhance workforce flexibility, countries
may choose other options.They can reduce employ-
ers’ termination costs by facilitating the use of fixed-
term contracts with a specific termination date and
by recourse to workers hired from temporary work
agencies. In general, there will not be advance
notices or severance pay in these cases, and it will
usually be difficult for employees to file an unfair
dismissal claim. Many countries eased regulations
regarding fixed-term contracts and temporary work
agencies. In particular, Italy, Greece, Spain and
Sweden have allowed employment of temporary
workers provided by temporary work agencies.
Restrictions on fixed-term contracts were eased in
Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands. Portugal and Sweden, but tightened in
France and Spain. Taking both options together,
Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the
Netherlands have moved furthest in the direction of
easier use of temporary work contracts (Table,
columns 3 and 4).
The deregulation regarding fixed-term contracts
and temporary work agencies has encouraged the
evolution of temporary employment contracts. As
a consequence, temporary work has become an
important component of employment growth in
many OECD countries since the mid 1980s. Yet in
most OECD countries less than 15% of employees
are in temporary work. Exceptions are Finland,
Australia and especially Spain (see Figure).
Employment protection of insiders only
Regarding the effect of employment protection on







Stricteness of Employment Pr otection
a)
Overall strictness
Regular Temporary Collective Version Version
employment employment dismissals 1
b) 2
c)
Country Late Late Late Late Late Late Late Late
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 1990s 1980s 1990s 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Austria 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 3.3 2.2 2.2 2.3
Belgium 1.5 1.5 4.6 2.8 4.1 3.1 2.1 2.5
Denmark 1.6 1.6 2.6 0.9 3.1 2.1 1.2 1.5
Finland 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.1
France 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.6 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.8
Germany 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.3 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.6
Greece 2.5 2.4 4.8 4.8 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.5
Ireland 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.3 2.1 0.9 0.9 1.1
Italy 2.8 2.8 5.4 3.8 4.1 4.1 3.3 3.4
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.2
Potugal 4.8 4.3 3.4 3.0 3.6 4.1 3.7 3.7
Spain 3.9 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.1
Sweden 2.8 2.8 4.1 1.6 4.5 3.5 2.2 2.6
United Kingdom 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.9 0.5 0.5 0.9
Japan 2.7 2.7 .. 2.1 1.5 .. 2.4 2.3
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 3.9 1.0 1.0 1.5
United States 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.9 0.2 0.2 0.7
Canada 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 3.4 0.6 0.6 1.1
Australia 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.6 0.9 0.9 1.2
New Zealand .. 1.7 .. 0.4 0.4 .. 1.0 0.9
.. = Data not available. – 
a) The scores can range from 0 to 6, with higher values representing stricter regulation. – 
b) Average of indicators for reg-
ular contracts and temporary contracts. – 
c) Weighted average of indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 1999.







some interesting conclusions.A cross-country com-
parison suggests that employment protection has
little or no effect on overall unemployment.It may,
however, influence its demographic composition.
In countries where employment protection is
stricter, unemployment tends to be lower for
prime-age men, but higher for younger workers
and, perhaps, prime-age women.
Concerning the employment
effects, employment protec-
tion strictness tends to reduce
the employment-to-popula-
tion ratio for the working-age
population. This negative
association holds true for
youth and prime-age women,
but reverses for prime-age
men, consistent with the
hypothesis that employment
security protects the jobs of
“insiders” and reduces the
employment chances of “out-
siders”. Stricter employment
protection is associated with
lower turnover in the labour market, with both jobs
and unemployment spells tending to last longer.
Fewer workers experience unemployment in any
one year in countries with stricter employment pro-
tection, but those becoming unemployed have a
greater probability of remaining unemployed for a
year or more.
Wolfgang Ochel